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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This paper is focused on hit batsmen in Major League Baseball from the 2008 
season through August 20
th
 of the 2013 season.  More specifically, this paper examines 
the characteristics of retaliation pitches and attempts to determine the intent of the 
pitcher.  The paper also takes into account moral hazard and cost-benefit analysis of 
hitting an opposing batsman.  There has been a vast amount of literature in economics 
with regard to hit batsmen in Major League Baseball.  However, very few of these papers 
have been able to evaluate economic theories in Major League Baseball using Pitchf/x 
data.  Pitchf/x technology became fully implemented into all thirty Major League 
ballparks prior to the 2008 season.  Pitchf/x provides us with intricate details of every 
pitch, which include velocity, movement, and pitch location.  Using Pitchf/x data, this 
paper presents a very detailed statistical analysis with regard to hit batsmen under a 
variety of scenarios.  A probit model is used to test for the probability of an intentional 
retaliation pitch based on a variety of predictor variables.  The most important conclusion 
we are able to draw from the two regression models presented in this paper is that, 
holding all other factors constant, retaliation pitches that are fastballs increase the 
probability of being intentional by roughly 17%.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The term “chin music” has been a slang term in baseball that dates back to the late 1800s.  
In the late 1800s “chin music” was used to describe heckling fans in the stadium.  However, 
sometime during WWII, it began being used as a synonym for a pitch intentionally thrown at an 
opposing batsman
1
.  The pitcher’s goal when throwing “chin music” is to intentionally send a 
message and strike fear into the opposing batsmen.  Baseball is unique in the fact that it has a set 
of unwritten rules with regard to hit batsmen. Generally, teams perceive the attitude that if you 
hit one of our guys, then we are going to hit one of your guys.  Intentionally throwing at an 
opposing batter can be very dangerous.  As a matter of fact, there has been one Major League 
player that was killed as a result of being hit by a pitch
2
.  In August of 1920, Cleveland Indians 
shortstop Ray Chapman was a hit by a pitch and died twelve hours later.  Shortly after 
Chapman’s unfortunate death, Major League Baseball implemented rules that outlawed 
intentionally throwing at a batter.   
Even though that it is illegal for pitchers to intentionally throw at opposing batsmen, it 
can be quite difficult for umpires to detect.  There are many times, the pitcher exhibits poor 
control and accidentally hits an opposing batter.  However, I believe that there are also a 
significant number of instances where this is not the case (i.e. Major League Baseball found it 
necessary to establish an official rule to outlaw intentional retaliation pitches).  Umpires can 
attempt to determine whether a pitcher is intentionally throwing at an opposing batter based on a 
certain set of conditions.  These conditions may include the score of the game, the inning, the 
type of pitch, the speed of the pitch, the quality of the teams, and whether a player has already 
                                                          
1
 http://www.annarbor.com/lifestyles/love-to-heckle-toast-or-should-we-stop-the-jeering/ 
2
 http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/sports/year_in_sports/08.17.html 
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been hit during the course of a game.  The final condition is perhaps the most important and will 
be referred to as a retaliation pitch in this paper. 
Another reason umpires have a difficult time detecting for retaliation pitches is because 
some guys are more prone to be hit by a pitch during the course of the game.  Often times, these 
players have a natural inclination to lean towards the plate in an attempt to get hit by the pitch 
and take first base.  There was a famous instance of a case like this that occurred just this past 
season.  In a game between the Los Angeles Dodgers and San Diego Padres on April 11
th
, 2013, 
Zack Greinke of the Dodgers hit Carlos Quentin of the Padres.  Benches cleared, punches were 
thrown, and several players and coaches were ejected, fined, and suspended.  However, there 
was a great debate because Carlos Quentin happens to be one of those players who is relatively 
well known for “leaning into” pitches and taking first base.  Dave Cameron and Jeff Sullivan of 
Fangraphs performed a brief investigation of the pitch that hit Carlos Quentin during that April 
11
th
 matchup
3
.  Cameron and Zimmerman used Pitchf/x data to examine all the pitches that had 
hit Quentin since the 2008 season.  During this span Quentin was hit by 95 pitches, and 
remarkably, four of these pitches were actually in the strike zone.  According to Major League 
rules, if a pitch is in the strike but hits the batsmen, the umpire is supposed to call that pitch a 
strike.  However, this can be quite deceiving to the naked eye, so umpires will rarely call a pitch 
that hits a batter a strike.   Cameron and Zimmerman then observed data on how many pitches 
Quentin had been hit by that were between 1.0 and 1.5 horizontal feet from the center of the plate 
compared to all other Major League players.  Most would agree that this range would be called a 
ball but would likely not hit a batter.  Moreover, the data indicates that 0.2% of pitches thrown in 
this range would result in a hit batsman.  For Quentin, this number is equal to 0.4%.  The pitch 
                                                          
3
 http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/carlos-quentins-hbp-zone/ 
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thrown by Greinke on April 11
th
 was 1.504 horizontal feet from the center of the plate.  Certainly 
this pitch would be considered a ball, but the overwhelming majority of batters would not be hit 
by the pitch. 
The purpose of the Grienke/Quentin example is to illustrate how difficult it can be to 
determine the intent of the pitcher.  It is impossible to truly understand Greinke’s intentions.  In 
addition, most pitchers will lie to avoid fines and suspensions.  Quentin certainly must have 
believed Greinke was trying to hit him, since he charged the mound and broke Greinke’s 
collarbone.  However, we must rely on the data to form our conclusions, and in this case the data 
indicates Greinke did not intentionally throw at Carlos Quentin.  
 Essentially, the purpose of my research is to determine important characteristics to help 
fans and umpires detect for intentional retaliation pitches.  In addition to examining these 
characteristics, I am also interested in testing for the presence of moral hazard.  Testing for the 
intent of the pitcher can be quite difficult, but I will use Pitchf/x data to help try and determine 
this.  I will assume that a pitch that is farther inside is more likely to be a pitch that is 
intentionally thrown to hit an opposing batter.  I will also assume that an intentional pitch is a 
pitch with little movement (i.e. a fastball) with slightly lower velocity than the average.  
However, it is nearly impossible to test for a pitch that that is lower in velocity because every 
pitcher has a different average fastball.  Moreover, Aroldis Chapman often throws his fastball 
over 100 mph, whereas Greg Maddux rarely threw his fastball over 90 mph.     
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 There has been extensive economic literature with regard to hit batsmen in Major League 
Baseball.  Many economists have disagreed whether retaliation pitches are directed at the 
opposing pitchers or one of the pitcher’s teammates.  This is not the focus of my research, but I 
will certainly touch on this debate.  The overwhelming majority of economic papers that focus 
on hit batsmen approach the topic from a moral hazard prospective or perform some type of cost-
benefit analysis.    
Batter up! Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule on Hit Batsmen 
by Goff, Shughart, and Tollison take a moral hazard
4
 approach when examining hit batsmen.  
The authors of this paper propose the idea that the introduction of the designated hitter rule in 
1973 created the potential for a classic moral hazard problem.  Moreover, American League 
pitchers are not required to appear at the plate; therefore, American League pitchers can throw at 
opposing hitters with lower costs than National League pitchers, who must take their turn at bat.  
The authors hypothesize that there will be in an increase in the number of hit batsmen in the 
American League compared to the National League as a result of the introduction of the 
designated hitter rule. 
 To test their hypothesis, Goff, Shughart, and Tollison use the following basic regression 
model: 
HBal – HBnl = β0 + β1DH + β2(Zal – Znl) + ε 
                                                          
4
 Moral hazard is a situation where a party will be more inclined to take risks because that party taking the risks 
will not have to incur the costs of the risks.  For example, people are more likely to drive recklessly if they are 
forced to wear a seatbelt.   
5 
 
The dependent variable they use is the difference between hit batsmen in the AL compared to the 
number of hit batsmen in the NL.  The variable “DH” is a dummy variable, which is equal to 
zero before 1973 and equal to 1 from 1973 through 1990 (DH rule introduced in MLB in 1973).   
The variables “Zal” and “Znl” represent a vector of explanatory variables that control for a 
variety of factors.  Like the data for hit batsmen, these control variables are also a set of yearly 
data (i.e. total number for a given season).  The control variables represented by the variable “Z” 
that the authors used include: at-bats, slugging average, home runs, bases on balls, strikeouts, 
saves, std. deviation of winning percentage, and attendance.  These variables account to control 
for the following factors, which include: pitcher control/ability, hitter ability, degree of 
competiveness of games, the amount of reliance on relief pitching, and the financial rewards of 
winning.  Their results indicate American League batters have been hit by pitches 10% to 15% 
more their National League counterparts in the seasons that followed the introduction of the 
designated hitter rule.  This result would imply that moral hazard does exist with regard to hit 
batsmen in Major League Baseball.  For the purpose of my research, I will assume that moral 
hazard exists if American League pitchers throw farther inside than National League pitchers. 
 Trandel, White, and Klein have a similar paper but disagree with Goff, Shughart, and 
Tollison’s moral hazard conclusion.  Trandel, White, and Klein argue that pitchers are generally 
poor batters; therefore, pitchers are not going to hit an opposing pitcher to put him on base.  
Because the National League has weaker hitters than the American League, this explains why 
fewer batters are hit in the National League.  The authors argue that rather than hitting an 
opposing pitcher to retaliate, teams are more likely to hit a star hitter on the opposing team.  
They propose a cost-benefit analysis and explain that hitting an opposing batter is costly; 
therefore, teams are far more likely to put a good hitter on base rather than a poor hitter.   
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DATA 
 The data used in this paper was retrieved primarily from the Pitchf/x database and 
Retrosheet database.  Pitchf/x is a detailed pitch tracking system, created by Sportvision, and is 
fully implemented into all Major League stadiums since the 2008 season.  Pitchf/x uses 
technology to account for the movement, location, and velocity of every pitch in Major League 
Baseball.  By accounting for these three characteristics, Pitchf/x is able to tell us what type of 
pitch was thrown.  Pitchf/x also provides us with the result of each pitch and each plate 
appearance.  I retrieved this data from baseballsavant.com, which allows sorting the data by the 
result of the pitch.  For the purpose of this paper, I am primarily interested in pitches that resulted 
in a hit batsman.  My data set consists of 8,948 hit batsmen from the beginning of 2008 season 
through August 20 of the 2013 season (the 2013 season was still in progress during my research).  
Only regular season games are included in my data set.  So far as identifying pitches is 
concerned, the Pitchf/x system is extremely accurate; however, the system does malfunction at 
times.  Approximately 0.2% of pitches cannot be identified.  These pitches were obviously 
dropped from my sample, since there is no data on these pitches.  Pitchf/x classifies the 
remaining pitches into 10 different types of pitches.  These pitch types include fastball, four-
seam fastball, two-seam fastball, cutter, sinker, slider, curveball, changeup, knuckle-curve, and 
knuckleball.  For the purpose of my research, I combined the four types of fastballs into one 
fastball category
5
.  I also considered including “sinker” in the fastball category but elected not to 
due to the increased vertical movement of a sinker.  I understand that two-seam fastball and 
cutter have some horizontal movement, but it is generally pretty small, especially when 
compared to a slider. 
                                                          
5
 Composed of fastball, four-seam fastball, two-seam fastball, & cutter. 
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 The retrosheet data allows users to download statistics from every box score of every 
Major League game.  Retrosheet does not provide the detailed pitch information like Pitchf/x; 
however, it does provide us with everything we may find in a typical box score.  The retrosheet 
data is quite extensive and goes back several decades.  With the combination of these two 
datasets, the possibilities for extensive research are quite captivating.       
 One key component of understanding the data and empirical tests in this is study is 
understanding what I define to be a retaliation pitch.  I was influenced on how to design the 
retaliation variable based on a paper titled Reversal of fortune: a statistical analysis of penalty 
calls in the National Hockey League by Abrevaya and McCulloch.  In the paper the authors 
examine whether a penalty is more likely to occur on one team if the previous penalty was called 
against the opposing team.  They describe the term reversal call to be a penalty call on a team 
that was not the last team penalized.   
This paper defines a retaliation pitch in a similar manner Abrevaya and McCulloch 
defined reversal calls.  A retaliation pitch is a pitch that hits a batter assuming that a batter on the 
opposing team was hit by a pitch previously in the game.  Moreover, let’s assume Team A is 
playing against Team B.  Let’s also suppose that the hit by pitch sequence during the course of 
the game is as follows: ABAB.  This would imply that there were three retaliation pitches during 
the course of the game.  Another possible hit by pitch sequence might be ABBA.  This would 
also imply three retaliation pitches.  However, the hit by pitch sequence AAAB would imply 
only one retaliation pitch.  There is no set rule for the number of retaliation pitches that may 
occur during the course of game.  It is possible that no retaliation pitches occur during a game 
and also possible that the number of retaliation pitches that occur is very high.  
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RELEVANT SUMMARY STATISTICS AND EXPLANATION OF KEY FIGURES/TABLES 
 Table 1, which can be seen below, shows the average horizontal distance (in feet) of the 
pitch at the moment when the baseball crosses the plate (or in the case of this paper hits a batter).  
The Pitchf/x system measures both the vertical and horizontal distance of every pitch at the point 
at which the ball crosses the plate.  The “feet inside” shown in Table 1 is the horizontal distance 
from the center of the plate.  The default of the Pitchf/x system is to act as traditional x and y 
plot.  Furthermore, a pitch to the left of the plate (towards a left handed batter) is negative and a 
pitch to the right of the plate (towards a right handed batter) is positive.  For the purpose of my 
research, I am primarily interested in analyzing the absolute values of these distances.  Figure 1 
is provided for a better understanding of the horizontal distance of pitches.   
 
 
Figure 1: Pitchf/x strike zone plot6 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
  For a further explanation of Figure 1: http://www.beyondtheboxscore.com/2009/4/17/841366/understanding-pitch-f-x-graphs 
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Condition Average Distance Inside (Feet) Average Distance Inside (Inches) 
All HBP 2.065 24.780 
HBP Top of the 1st 2.036 24.432 
HBP Top of the 1st (Fastballs) 2.018 24.216 
Retaliation Pitch 2.101 25.212 
Retaliation Pitch (Fastballs) 2.114 25.368 
AL HBP 2.074 24.888 
AL Retaliation HBP 2.114 25.368 
AL Retaliation HBP (Fastballs) 2.113 25.356 
NL HBP 2.057 24.684 
NL Retaliation HBP 2.090 25.080 
NL Retaliation HBP (Fastballs) 2.114 25.368 
Table 1: Average horizontal distance of HBP 
  
Table 1 does not tell us whether these results are statistically significant or not; however, 
we are able to draw few important preliminary results from these estimations.  First of all, there 
were 8,948 hit batsmen in this dataset.  I used the top of the first inning as a baseline to show 
average of feet of a batter hit in the top of the first inning.  It can be expected that no pitch in the 
top of the first inning will be a retaliation pitch.  The table shows that retaliation pitches that are 
only fastballs are farther inside than the average retaliation pitch.  This is interesting because 
fastballs are usually the pitch that pitchers have the best control over.  Interestingly, Table 1 also 
supports Goff Shughart and Tollison’s moral hazard theory to a certain extent.  Both retaliation 
pitches and all hit by pitches in the American League are farther inside than in the National 
League; however, the results show that the average feet inside for a fastball retaliation pitch is 
nearly identical for both leagues. 
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All HBP Retaliation HBP Non-Retaliation HBP 
Pitch Type Percentage Pitch Type Percentage Pitch Type Percentage 
Changeup 4.29% Changeup 3.97% Changeup 4.34% 
Curveball 10.16% Curveball 9.75% Curveball 10.22% 
Fastball 56.15% Fastball 58.26% Fastball 55.82% 
Knuckle-Curve 0.45% 
Knuckle-
Curve 0.25% 
Knuckle-
Curve 0.48% 
Knuckleball 0.75% Knuckleball 0.83% Knuckleball 0.74% 
Sinker 14.08% Sinker 15.62% Sinker 13.84% 
Slider 14.13% Slider 11.32% Slider 14.56% 
Table 2: Pitch type breakdown 
 Table 2, shown above, provides us with a breakdown of the types of pitches thrown that 
hit opposing batsmen.  This table presents us with the difference scenarios, which include all hit 
batsmen, hit batsmen hit by a retaliation pitch, and hit batsmen hit by a non-retaliation.  Not 
surprising, the overwhelming majority of pitches thrown are fastballs.  We also do not observe a 
great deal of variation among the three scenarios.  Interestingly, there are more fastballs thrown 
for retaliation pitches, which would certainly support my hypothesis.    
Inning Percent 
0 12.43% 
1 24.95% 
2 21.15% 
3 15.58% 
4 8.91% 
5 7.14% 
6 5.19% 
7 2.97% 
8 1.30% 
Table 3: Interval of retaliation pitches 
Table 3, which can be seen above, represents the number of innings Team A takes to 
retaliate and hit a batter on Team B (assuming a player on Team A has already been hit).  Similar 
to the retaliation pitch definition there is no limit on how many times this statistic can occur 
11 
 
during the course of a game.  On average it takes a team approximately 2.517 innings to throw a 
retaliation pitch when their own player has already been hit by a pitch.  Table 3 and Figure 2 
clearly illustrate that teams do not waste time when throwing retaliation pitches.  Moreover, 
approximately 74.12% of teams throw a retaliation pitch between 0 & 3 innings.   
 
Figure 2: Interval of innings between retaliation pitches 
  
The following two histograms (Figure 3 and Figure 4) illustrate the number of retaliation 
pitches based on the inning.  The histograms only include innings 1-8 because there are many 
instances where the home team will not take at-bats in the ninth inning due to the circumstances 
of the game.  However, as expected, the results show an increasing trend as the game progresses.  
This is rational because there are more pitches thrown as the game progresses; therefore, greater 
opportunity for retaliation pitches in the later innings.  The one exception is that the results show 
a clear decline in the number of retalition pitches in the fifth inning.  One possible explanation as 
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to the decline we see in the fifth inning could be that starting pitchers place additional emphasis 
on the fifth inning in order to qualify for the win.  As archaic as the win statistic is in Major 
League Baseball, there is no question that starting pitchers are motivated to earn a win for 
themselves.  The overwhelming majority of front offices in Major League Baseball do not 
analyze pitcher win/loss record when evaluating players; however, many fans and writers 
consider pitcher win/loss record when voting for all-stars, Cy Young award, most valuable 
player award, etc.  Essentially starting pitchers trying to qualify for the win during a game may 
choose not to throw an intentional retaliation pitch during the fifth inning in an effort to not put 
an opposing player on base.   
 
Figure 3: Retaliation pitches by inning 
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Figure 4: Retaliation pitches by inning (fastballs only) 
 
The next set of figures and tables show how retalation pitches are related to the winning 
percentage of the team throwing the retaliation pitch.  I chose to divide teams into three equal 
groups based on winning percentage.  The first group is the top one-third of teams since 2008.  
These teams have a winning percentage greater than .540.  The second group is the middle-third 
of teams.  These teams have a winning percentage between .457 and .540.  The final group is the 
bottom-third of Major League teams.  These teams have a winning percentage less than .457.  
Interestingly, these results show a positive correlation between winning percentage and 
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question that is certainly true, there also must be a rational explaination as to why winning teams 
throw more reataliation pitches. 
Winning Percentage 
Total Retaliation 
Pitches 
Top one-third 375 
Middle one-third 358 
Bottom one-third 288 
Top one-third (Fastballs Only) 209 
Middle one-third (Fastballs 
Only) 201 
Bottom one-third (Fastballs 
Only) 168 
Table 4: Retaliation pitches based on winning percentage 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Retaliation pitches by winning percentage <.457 
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Figure 6: Retaliation pitches by winning percentage between .457 & .540 
 
Figure 7: Retaliation pitches by winning percentage > .540 
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Figure 8: Retaliation pitches by winning percentage < .457 (Fastballs) 
 
Figure 9: Retaliation pitches by winning percentage between .457 & .540 (Fastballs) 
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Figure 10: Retaliation pitches by winning percentage > .540 
  
 One possible explanation as to why better teams throw significantly more retaliation 
pitches than poor teams could be that the better teams are more invested in the outcome of the 
season.  Moreover, I believe that if a star player (or any starting player) on a good team was hit 
by a pitch then the good team would be more likely to take offense than if a star player on a poor 
team was hit by a pitch.  The winning teams are fully invested in the season and are strongly 
concerned with potential post-season implications; therefore, they are incentivized to retaliate in 
an effort to ensure their player(s) are not hit by a pitch by opposing teams in the future.  
 The next set of figures and tables illustrate the first hit batter during the course of a game 
based on the inning when a retaliation pitch occurs during the course of the game.  Essentially 
these results represent the pitch that motivated the opposing pitcher to throw a retaliation pitch.  
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first hit batter to occur during the beginning of the game.  This is the completely opposite effect 
that occurred for reataliation pitches, which can be seen in Figures 3 and 4 (i.e. retaliation pitches 
were more likely to occur as the game progressed).  It is clear that when there is a hit batsmen in 
a game, this event occurs very early.  Moreover, almost half (45.38%) of the first hit batsmen 
occurs in the first two innings.  
Inning of 1st 
HBP Percent 
1 24.29% 
2 21.09% 
3 14.56% 
4 13.56% 
5 9.60% 
6 8.31% 
7 4.85% 
8 2.27% 
Table 5: First HBP during course of game 
 
Figure 11: Inning of first HBP 
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 Table 6, which can be seen below, essentially illustrates how often chaos ensues during 
the course of a baseball game.  Chaos would imply that there is a high number of hit batsmen in 
a single game.   
HBP per 
Game Percent 
1 51.17% 
2 33.48% 
3 10.97% 
4 3.59% 
5+ 0.79% 
Table 6: Frequency of number of HBP per game 
Table 6 only includes games where there is at least one hit batsmen.  The results show that there 
are very few games with a high number of HBPs.  Interestingly, over half of games with at least 
one hit batsman only have one HBP.  This would imply that retaliation pitches might be 
somewhat of rare phenomenon.  One detail not provided in the table, but I believe to be relevant 
is the number of hit batsmen per game (when there is at least one HBP during game).  This 
number is equal to approximately 1.696 HBP per game.    
 Tables 7 and 8 break down retaliation pitches by team and league, respectively.  These 
tables show us whether there is a team or league that throws an exceptionally high number of 
retaliation pitches.  I find the results in table 7 exceptionally interesting.  Perhaps, the biggest 
rivalry in all of sports is between the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox.  As one might 
expect, the Yankees and Red Sox throw the highest percent of retaliation pitches.  There is a 
perception that the Yankees and Red Sox do not like each other very much, so it is interesting 
that these two teams lead the MLB in retaliation pitches.   
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Team 
Retaliation Pitches 
(%) 
ALL HBP 
(%) 
ARI 4.05 3.69 
ATL 1.82 3.11 
BAL 2.56 3.64 
BOS 5.54 4.26 
CHC 3.39 3.84 
CIN 4.05 3.67 
CLE 4.96 3.54 
COL 2.23 3.06 
CWS 2.98 3.05 
DET 3.72 3.34 
HOU 2.64 3.15 
KC 2.07 3.27 
LAA 3.06 3.05 
LAD 3.06 3.13 
MIA 3.14 3.05 
MIL 3.72 2.74 
MIN 2.56 3.15 
NYM 3.64 3.58 
NYY 5.04 3.64 
OAK 2.98 2.69 
PHI 3.97 3.60 
PIT 3.64 3.61 
SD 2.81 2.46 
SEA 1.74 2.89 
SF 3.88 3.34 
STL 3.55 3.33 
TB 3.47 3.15 
TEX 3.14 3.64 
TOR 3.22 4.14 
WSH 3.39 3.17 
Table 7: HBP by team 
 Based on the theory of moral hazard, we would expect the American League to throw 
more retaliation pitches than the National League.  However, table 8 presents us with the 
opposite result.  Moreover, it is evident that National League pitchers actually hit more batters 
than American League pitchers.  One possible explanation for this result could be that National 
League pitchers are more inclined to hit an opposing batsman because they know they have the 
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opportunity to face the opposing pitcher.  It is possible that National League pitchers expect the 
opposing pitcher to make an out when he takes his turn at bat.  Essentially, it is less costly for 
National League pitchers to put a man on base (i.e. hit an opposing batter) than American League 
pitchers.   
League 
Retaliation Pitches 
(%) 
ALL HBP 
(%) 
AL 47.77 47.98 
NL 52.23 52.02 
Table 8: HBP by league 
 
 Finally, it is important to consider how pitchers behave depending on the situation of 
the game.  Sabermetercians
7
 have actually developed a leverage index that allows fo us to 
quantify a situation during the course of a baseball game.  Essentially, there are some points 
during a game that are more suspenseful than other, and a leverage index allows us to observe 
differences in performance at these different levels.  There are three levels, which are broken 
down as high, medium, and low.  These levels are calculated based on the inning, score of the 
game, number of outs, and number of men on base.  A tie ball game in the bottom of the ninth 
with two outs and the bases loaded would imply a high leverage situation.  Conversely, if it is the 
bottom of the first inning with the home team down six runs with nobody out and nobody on 
base, this would illustrate a low leverage situation.  The vast majority of situations during the 
game are low leverage
8
.  Table 9 listed below shows HBP based on leverage.  The data is 
comprised of all games from 2008 through the 2013 seasons.   
 
 
                                                          
7
 A sabermetrician is one is studies advanced baseball statistics (i.e. sabermetrics).  
8
 Approximately 60% of situations are low leverage.  The remaining 40% include medium and high leverage 
situations, with majority of that being medium leverage situations.   
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HBP by Leverage 
Leverage  Percent 
Total 
PA 
Total 
HBP 
Low 0.80% 542737 4359 
Medium  0.86% 456934 3917 
High 0.97% 114885 1115 
Table 9: HBP by leverage 
 The percentage seen in the table implies the percentage of hit batsmen per plate 
appearance.  Interestingly, we observe that as the situation in the game becomes more important, 
there is a positive correlation with the number of hit batsmen.  I would have expected to observe 
the opposite effect because I would have expected pitchers to focus more, which should result in 
better control.  However, the results indicate that pitchers may become more nervous in high 
leverage situations, which causes poor control, which ultimately leads to a higher percentage of 
hit batsmen.  Another possibility could be a problem of a small sample size for the high leverage 
situations.  Over 100,000 plate appearance certainly seems to be a large amount; however, it is 
relatively small compared to the number of plate appearances observed with the low leverage 
situation.     
 The leverage situations can be quite difficult to quantify, and I have yet to determine 
how to analyze leverage with regard to retaliation pitches.  However, I would not expect pitchers 
to throw retaliation pitches in a high leverage situation.  I believe that teams value winning 
games more than they value following the unwritten rules in baseball (i.e. throwing a retaliation 
pitch).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
FORMAL REGRESSION AND RESULTS 
  
Table 10, which can be seen below, provides a description of the key variables used in 
the two regression models. 
Table 10: Description of key variables 
There are two regression models used to estimate the intent of the pitch, and both models 
are fairly similar.  Probit models require a binary (i.e. coded with zeros and ones) dependent 
variable but allow us to predict for the probability for the intent of the pitch.  In order to generate 
this binary variable, I calculated the average horizontal distance of a pitch that hits a batter.  This 
distance was equal to 2.065 feet.  I then added one standard deviation to the mean, which equaled 
approximately 2.583 feet.  A pitch with a horizontal distance greater than 2.583 feet was equal to 
one, and I assume to be intentionally thrown at a batsmen.  A pitch less than 2.583 feet was equal 
to zero, and I assume that pitch did not intentionally hit the batter.   
The binary dependent variable is referred to as “intent” and predicts the probability that a 
particular pitch was intentional based on a variety of circumstances.  There are also a number of 
predictor variables, which include “pitch,” “inning,” “winperc,” and “AL.”  “Pitch” is perhaps 
the most important variable and is a dummy variable equal to one if the pitch is considered a 
retaliation pitch and equal to zero otherwise.  The variable “inning” is equal the inning in which 
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the hit batsman occurred.  “Winperc” is equal to the winning percentage of the team of the pitch 
who hit the opposing batsmen.  Finally, “AL” is a dummy variable equal to one if the pitcher is 
on an American League team and zero if the pitcher is on a National League team. 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 (Fastballs) 
Intercept 
-0.825 
(-6.98)*** 
-0.907 
(-5.76)*** 
pitch 
0.051 
(1.10) 
0.170 
(2.84)*** 
inning 
0.014 
(2.37)** 
0.011 
(1.33) 
winperc 
-0.533 
(-2.34)** 
-0.397 
(-1.31) 
AL 
0.041 
(1.28) 
0.038 
(0.89) 
Note: z-statistics are in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate significance at the 1% (***), 5%(**), and 10%(*) levels 
Table 11: Regression results 
  
The only difference between the two probit regression models is that the first model 
accounts for all hit batsmen, whereas the second model only includes hit batsmen that were hit 
by fastballs.  Interestingly, both regression models show a positive correlation in that a retaliation 
pitch increases the probability of that pitch being a pitch that was intentionally thrown at a batter 
(i.e. greatest horizontal distance from the center of the plate).  However, only the second 
regression, which only includes fastballs, is statistically significant.  A retaliation pitch is 
actually statistically significant at the 1% level for the fastballs model.  The model tells us that 
assuming all other factors are equal to zero, a retaliation pitch that is a fastball is roughly 17% 
more likely to be intentional.  This result falls right in line with my hypothesis, as I suggested 
pitchers are likely to have the best control of their fastball.  Since there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with throwing a retaliation pitch farther inside, this would 
suggest that perhaps pitchers are intentionally trying to hit an opposing batsman with this pitch.  
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Furthermore, since the “pitch” variable is not significant in the first model, this would imply that 
the off-speed pitches that hit batters are likely mistakes.  
 The two models also allow us to consider for moral hazard with regard to the differences 
between the American and National Leagues and throwing a pitch intentionally at an opposing 
batsmen.  While the results initially indicate that there is a positive correlation with regard to 
American League pitchers throwing farther inside than National League pitchers, this result is 
not statistically significant; therefore, I am unable to conclude that moral hazard is a factor when 
pitchers are intentionally retaliating.  While I believe it is certainly possible and perhaps even 
likely that moral hazard is a factor with regard to hit batsmen, my results indicate that it is not 
relevant with regard to intentionally throwing at an opposing batsmen.  The paper by Goff, 
Shughart, and Tollison found that American League pitchers are more likely to throw inside than 
National League pitchers; however, maybe there is no significant difference between the two 
leagues when pitchers are intentionally throwing at an opposing batter.  Perhaps, that when 
pitchers find the need to throw a retaliation pitch, they do not consider any sort of consequences.  
This would suggest that pitchers simply follow the unwritten rule in Major League Baseball, 
which was referred to previously: “if you hit one of our guys, then we are going to hit one of 
your guys.”  
 So far as the final two explanatory variables (“inning” and “winperc”) are concerned in 
the two models, they do not provide us with strong and useful conclusions.  As a matter of fact, 
these two variables are only statistically significant (at the 5% level) in the first regression.  The 
negative coefficient on the “winperc” variable implies an inverse relationship between winning 
percentage and throwing inside.  Moreover, better teams will throw inside less.  This is the 
opposite effect that was observed in summary statistics section of this paper.  However, we see 
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no statistical significance with regard to fastballs.  The inning coefficient also provides us with 
very little useful information; however it is statistically significant at the 5% level in the first 
regression.  Previously we observed the drop in hit batsmen in the fifth inning, so this could 
explain the inconsistency in the “inning” variable in the model.    
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FUTURE WORK 
 The Pitchf/x database is a fantastic resource that has allowed baseball enthusiasts to 
explore many of our important questions regarding baseball.  However, the technology is still 
fairly new and is constantly improving; therefore, in some respect, we are still limited by what 
we can study.   
One aspect that is very important to a pitcher’s control is the pitcher’s pitching 
mechanics.  Often times, poor or inconsistent pitching mechanics will result in wildness, which 
could likely lead to a hit batsmen.  For decades, it has proved to be a struggle to evaluate 
pitching mechanics over a large sample.  Many researchers have observed film and photographs 
to evaluate pitching mechanics, but this method usually proves to result in a relatively small 
sample size.  We are still learning how we can use the Pitchf/x system to evaluate pitching 
mechanics.  Mike Fast of Baseball Prospectus provides an excellent analysis of how pitching 
mechanics can be evaluated using Pitchf/x
9
.  Pitchf/x does not do a very good job explaining to 
us  the pitcher’s release point.  Pitchf/x has proved to be quite accurate with the information and 
data of a pitch when the baseball is in the vicinity of home plate and even as the baseball travels 
towards the plate.  However, the area in the vicinity of the pitcher’s mound (i.e. pitcher’s release 
point) could still be improved.  The reasoning for this is that Pitchf/x cameras that are installed in 
each of the thirty Major League ballparks are calibrated based on certain “landmarks” within the 
ball’s trajectory.  Home plate is closer to more “landmarks” within the ballpark, whereas the 
pitcher’s mound is essentially in the middle of the baseball diamond.  Many researches have 
attempted to estimate a fixed release point for all pitchers.  However, the issue with this method 
is that pitchers are different heights with different wingspans, which will certainly result in a 
                                                          
9
 http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=12432 
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variation of release points.  This method would likely only be effective if evaluating individual 
pitching mechanics rather than a large sample size.   
The Pitchf/x system does provide us with the release speed of every pitch.  This velocity 
is calculated at the point in which the system believes the pitcher releases the ball; however, it is 
likely this point occurs shortly after the pitcher actually releases the ball.  This point is measured 
in horizontal feet from the center of the pitching rubber to vertical feet from the ground.  Figure 
12 should provide a better understanding of this idea.  Despite the fact that this is not the true 
moment that the pitcher actually releases the baseball, we could still use this point because it is 
expected to be the same for each individual pitcher.  In order to evaluate pitching mechanics 
using this point, one would only include fastballs in the dataset because pitchers are likely to 
change their arm angles in an effort to produce movement on the baseball.  It would also be 
necessary to construct a sample of pitchers that pitch a sufficient amount of innings so that you 
could derive an accurate sample mean of the release point for each individual pitcher.  You 
would then flag pitches within your dataset that deviate too far from each pitcher’s given mean.  
I would hypothesize that retaliation pitches with a release point closer to the pitcher’s average 
release point would more likely to be thrown intentionally at an opposing batsmen.    
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Figure 12: Release point graphic 
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CONCLUSION 
Attempting to detect for intentional retaliation pitches has certainly proved to be a 
difficult task due to the fact that is impossible to fully understand the pitcher’s thoughts and 
motives as he throws a pitch from the mound.  However, I am certain that the method I have 
used is a strong start in an effort to better understand this phenomenon in Major League 
Baseball.   
Sports provide economists with an abundance of accurate data to test economic theory, 
and I am excited with the direction of statistical analysis in Major League Baseball.  Baseball has 
taken the lead in statistical analysis in sports.  Because of this, many economists and 
sabermetricians are incentivized to test not only economic theory but pursue their own personal 
interests in baseball.  For some reason, baseball has always been a subject that has interested 
various individuals to study and with the implementation of Pitchf/x, this will only intensify 
future research.  As the Pitchf/x system continues to advance and become more accurate, I am 
certain that our knowledge of baseball will also become more advanced.  The Pitchf/x data has 
only existed since the 2008 season, so we will continue to learn how we can evaluate advanced 
baseball statistics in a more riveting and innovative manner.  
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